Who's afraid of an EU tax and why? : revenue system preferences in the European parliament by Heinemann, Friedrich et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 08-027
Who’s Afraid of an EU Tax and Why? –
Revenue System Preferences 
in the European Parliament
Friedrich Heinemann, Philipp Mohl, 
and Steffen Osterloh
Dis cus si on Paper No. 08-027
Who’s Afraid of an EU Tax and Why? –
Revenue System Preferences 
in the European Parliament
Friedrich Heinemann, Philipp Mohl, 
and Steffen Osterloh
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08027.pdf
  
Non-Technical Summary 
The idea to establish some kind of EU tax as a new (and true) own resource has been widely 
and controversially debated as a reform option for the revenue side of the EU budget. Given 
these controversies we study in our contribution how the heterogeneity of preferences with 
regard to an EU tax can be explained among important political actors across EU countries. 
For that purpose our empirical study makes use of a unique data base: a survey among Mem-
bers of the European Parliament which has successfully been conducted in spring 2007. Based 
on this outstanding database this study sheds light on the question how this diversity of views 
on the idea of an EU tax is understandable and, thus, contributes to a better understanding of 
the heterogeneous opinions which is essential for the development of realistic reform options 
in the coming general review on the EU budgetary system. 
In the theoretical part we develop testable hypotheses on the likely determinants of EU tax 
preferences. On the one hand, the “ideological approach” would simply suggest that a MEP’s 
view at the idea of an EU tax is predominantly driven by her party’s tax ideology, so that 
ideological positions related to the preferred level of European integration, the role of gov-
ernment or the acceptability of tax competition could be important aspects. A contrasting 
view, the “principal-agents approach”, points at the role of national interests, which implies 
that EU tax preferences should be linked to nationality of a MEP rather than to party member-
ship. Therefore, expectations on the national advantages/disadvantages, for example with re-
spect to the distributional consequences of a specific EU tax, should be of importance. More-
over, individual characteristics of MEPs should play a role, as theory stresses that the degree 
of information should impact views. 
Our empirical results confirm an important role for ideology but they also demonstrate that 
both individual and country characteristics are equally important in shaping the support for an 
EU tax. Regarding the preference for specific tax bases for the EU tax, additional dimensions 
of the national interest are important. Parliamentarians from high tax countries are particularly 
supportive of an EU corporate tax which points to the motive of alleviating pressure from tax 
competition. With respect to an EU tax on financial transactions the distributional conse-
quences are significant and representatives from countries with important financial centres 
tend to be opposed.  
 
 
  
Zusammenfassung 
Die Einführung einer EU-Steuer als neue (und “wahre”) Eigenmittelquelle ist als Reformopti-
on für die Einnahmeseite des EU-Haushalts bereits seit langem kontrovers diskutiert worden. 
In Anbetracht dieser Kontroversen untersuchen wir in unserem Beitrag, wie die Heterogenität 
der Präferenzen wichtiger politischer Akteure in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten hinsichtlich einer 
EU-Steuer erklärt werden kann. Zu diesem Zweck nutzt unsere empirische Untersuchung eine 
einzigartige Datenbasis: eine Umfrage unter Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments 
(MdEP), die im Frühjahr 2007 durchgeführt wurde. Auf der Basis dieser Datengrundlage 
wirft diese Untersuchung Licht auf die Frage, wie die Unterschiedlichkeit der Ansichten ge-
genüber der Idee einer EU-Steuer verstanden werden kann und trägt dadurch zu einem besse-
ren Verständnis der heterogenen Ansichten bei. Dieses ist insbesondere von Bedeutung für die 
Entwicklung von realistischen Reformoptionen in der bevorstehenden Überprüfung des Haus-
haltssystems der EU.  
Im theoretischen Teil entwickeln wir testbare Hypothesen bezüglich der wahrscheinlichen 
Determinanten der Präferenzen für eine EU-Steuer. Einerseits deutet der „ideologische An-
satz“ darauf hin, dass die Sicht eines MdEP zur Idee einer EU-Steuer vornehmlich von der 
Ideologie seiner Partei getrieben wird, so dass ideologische Positionen bezogen auf das ge-
wünschte Ausmaß der europäischen Integration, die Rolle des Staates oder die Akzeptanz des 
Steuerwettbewerbs bedeutsame Aspekte sein könnten. Eine gegensätzliche Perspektive, der 
„Prinzipal-Agent-Ansatz“, deutet auf den Einfluss von nationalen Interessen hin. Dieses imp-
liziert, dass die Einstellungen gegenüber einer EU-Steuer eher mit der Nationalität eines 
MdEP verbunden sind als mit dessen Parteimitgliedschaft. Daher sollten die Erwartungen in 
Bezug auf nationale Vor- und Nachteile, beispielsweise hinsichtlich der Verteilungseffekte 
einer spezifischen EU-Steuer, von Bedeutung sein. Zudem sollten auch individuelle Charakte-
ristika der MdEP eine Rolle spielen, da die Theorie nahelegt, dass der Informationsstand eines 
MdEP einen Einfluss auf die Präferenzen hat.   
Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse bestätigen eine bedeutende Rolle der Ideologie, aber sie zei-
gen ebenfalls, dass sowohl individuelle als auch landesspezifische Charakteristika ebenso 
wichtig in der Meinungsbildung zur EU-Steuer sind. Hinsichtlich der Präferenzen für spezifi-
sche Steuerbasen einer EU-Steuer sind zusätzliche Dimensionen des nationalen Interesses von 
Bedeutung. Parlamentarier aus Hochsteuerländern unterstützen besonders eine EU-
Körperschaftssteuer, was auf deren Motiv hindeutet, den vom Steuerwettbewerb ausgehenden 
Druck mindern zu wollen. Hinsichtlich einer EU-Steuer auf Devisentransaktionen sind die 
  
Verteilungseffekte signifikant und Vertreter aus Ländern mit bedeutenden Finanzplätzen leh-
nen diese tendenziell ab.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Judged by its substantive legislative competencies, the European Union constitutes rather the 
top level of government in a European federal system than an international organisation. By 
contrast, the Union’s revenue system is still missing the typical ingredients of a mature federal 
level. The European budgetary authorities do not possess a general competence to cover ex-
penditures by issuing debt. Neither do they command over any tax resources in an autono-
mous way. Instead, the EU budget depends largely on contributions from the member states. 
Although these payments are termed “own resources” they hardly imply a significant degree 
of revenue autonomy for the budgetary organs of the Union. This contrast feeds a continuing 
debate on the adequacy of the revenue system. In this context the idea to establish some kind 
of EU tax as a new (and true) own resource has been widely and controversially debated as a 
reform option for the revenue side of the EU budget at least since the 1980s (Biehl 1988). 
Supporters point at the gain of cost transparency which they hope to achieve through an EU 
tax. Opponents fear lower budgetary discipline at the EU level as a result of such a reform.  
While we only briefly touch upon the arguments in this normative controversy our main ob-
jective is to shed light on a positive question: We want to explore which forces can explain 
why some European decision makers favour and others oppose the idea of a fundamental re-
form of the EU's revenue system towards an autonomous tax source. In a more general sense, 
we thus want to understand the factors that explain the evolution or stickiness of an interna-
tional organisation's financing system. For this purpose, we make use of a unique database: a 
survey among Members of the European Parliament (MEP) which was conducted in spring 
and summer 2007 and which resulted in a response of some 150 Members of the European 
Parliament. The survey includes questions with regard to the desirability, specification and 
likely consequences of granting the European Union an autonomous tax competency.  
To the best of our knowledge, empirically based positive analyses of international organisa-
tions’ revenue systems and their evolution do not exist so far. Early contributions like Kravis 
and Davenport (1963) or more recent ones like Euler (2005) or Meermagen (2002) are charac-
terised largely by classifying and normative approaches: For example, Euler (2005) makes a 
distinction between financing models for international organisations based on either an abil-
ity-to-pay principle or on the principle of equivalence. A normative recommendation of that 
literature is that organisations with a particular focus on a single public good are best suited 
for a contribution scheme based on the principle of equivalence. In line with this recommen-
dation, contributions to the World Trade Organisation are calculated according to a country’s 
 2
share in world trade whereas organisations with a broader spectre of tasks – such as the Euro-
pean Union – should rather opt for the ability-to-pay principle. Overall this literature is silent 
on positive explanations for the observable evolution of the contribution systems so that our 
work complements it. 
Apart from the literature on international organisations’ financing systems our contribution is 
of importance at least with respect to two further strands of literature: firstly, to the literature 
on decision making within the European Parliament and secondly to the literature on the for-
mation of economic beliefs.   
Empirical analyses on decision making in the European Parliament have centred on the ques-
tion whether MEPs vote rather along (European) political group than along country lines. Re-
cent contributions (Hix 2002; Hix and Noury 2006; Hix et al. 2007; Kreppel et al. 1999) 
based on the empirical inspection of roll-call votes consistently stress that party cohesion of 
voting behaviour in the EP clearly exceeds national cohesion. Interestingly, however, budget-
ary votes compared to other policy fields are characterised by slightly larger national cohesion 
(Hix and Noury 2006). The same holds for policy fields with strong and heterogenously de-
fined national interests such as foreign policy (Aspinwall 2002). These results suggest that the 
existence of strong national interests tends to undermine party cohesion in the EP. A natural 
shortcoming of the roll-call (i.e. recorded) vote literature is that this data does not allow to 
identify individual policy preferences directly: Actual voting in the EP is not only determined 
by MEPs’ preferences but also by explicit or implicit sanctions for group members whose 
votes defect from the party line. In this sense, the roll-call vote literature answers the question 
to which extent MEPs vote along the party or along the country dimension but it is unable to 
decide whether this voting behaviour really reflects preferences. Our survey is unrelated to an 
immediate voting decision in the European Parliament and, hence, related to the preference 
dimension.  
Furthermore, this study contributes to the understanding of formation of economic beliefs in 
general and tax policy beliefs in particular. Comparisons of economic beliefs between the 
general public and economists (Caplan 2002; Blinder and Krueger 2004) do not only point to 
significant differences between both groups but also towards a strong link between ideology 
and the perception of economic phenomena. The same ideological bias has recently been 
demonstrated for Members of the German Bundestag with respect to the perception of global-
isation constraints for corporate tax policy: Party ideology does not only determine equity 
preferences but also shapes the perception, e.g., about the tax elasticity of corporate invest-
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ment decisions (Heinemann and Janeba 2007). Obviously, this literature on tax beliefs in na-
tional parliaments is only of limited relevance to belief formation in an international organisa-
tion where conflicting national interests potentially play a role. 
The starting point of our empirical approach is that preferences with regard to desirable fi-
nance options for the EU budget can be assumed to be driven by a bundle of aspects. On the 
one hand, ideological positions related to the preferred level of European integration, the role 
of government or the acceptability of tax competition could be important – aspects which 
should be closely related to party preferences. On the other hand, views related to the individ-
ual, institutional or national self-interest of political decision makers may play a role as well. 
As to the national perspective the attraction of an EU tax among MEPs should be influenced 
by expectations on the national advantages/disadvantages, for example with respect to the 
distributional consequences of a specific EU tax.  
Our results confirm an important role for ideology (measured by party affiliation) but they 
also demonstrate that both individual and country characteristics are equally important in 
shaping the support for an EU tax. MEPs from new member countries but also members from 
net payer countries tend to be sceptical about an EU tax in general. When it comes to the pref-
erence for specific tax bases for the EU tax additional dimensions of the national interest are 
important: With respect to an EU corporate tax, parliamentarians from high tax countries are 
particularly supportive pointing to the motive of alleviating pressure from tax competition. 
With respect to an EU tax on financial transactions the distributional consequences are sig-
nificant and representatives from countries with important financial centres tend to be op-
posed. Our empirics can be regarded as a conservative test for the relevance of national inter-
ests in the debate on reforming the EU’s revenue system because compared to members of 
national governments or parliaments, MEPs have a more European perspective. The results 
help to understand the contrast between the EU’s mature legislative and political role on the 
one hand and its limited revenue autonomy on the other hand: National interests with respect 
to the revenue system are still too powerful and heterogeneous for a unanimous agreement on 
substantial reforms.   
The paper’s outline is as follows: We continue in the following section 2 with a brief institu-
tional description of the revenue side of the EU budget and a summary of arguments pro and 
contra an EU tax. Section 3 presents our testable approach to belief formation. Section 4 de-
scribes the survey and discusses descriptive findings while section 5 is devoted to economet-
ric tests. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. The revenue side of the EU budget and the EU tax debate  
Currently, the EU is financed by the so-called “own resources”1. Although this term suggests 
a certain degree of autonomy, the revenue side of the budget has rather the character of a con-
tribution system where the EU depends on the member states to unanimously accept their 
contribution obligation. Only a very small part of the revenues (13.9% in 2006; European 
Commission 2007d) are raised in the context of policies with full EU competency: the so-
called “traditional own resources” which accrue from agricultural duties and levies as well as 
customs duties. The lion’s share, however, consists of contributions which are paid by mem-
ber countries financed out of their national tax revenues. The smaller part of these, the “VAT 
own resource” (15.9% in 2006), was initially the dominant financial source of the EU and is 
linked to the national VAT tax base. With the reduction of the VAT own resource in recent 
years the “GNI own resource” has become the dominant source for the European budget 
(64.7% in 2006). This resource tops up the revenues of the other resources (which in addition 
include revenues from taxes on EU civil servants or fines by companies paid to the EU). The 
GNI resource is shared in proportion to national GNI by member countries and has the func-
tion to balance the budget. Deficits are not allowed. 
The calculation of member state shares in contribution is complicated by several special pro-
visions:2 Best known is the UK rebate which exists since Margaret Thatcher’s success in the 
Fontainebleau agreement in 1985. Additional abatements were introduced in the course of 
time, the most recent ones in the last Financial Perspective benefiting four further countries, 
namely the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria (European Council 2005).  
Although the system in its current form has endowed the EU with stable and reliable revenues 
in the past, in the literature, e.g., the Commission’s report on the operation of the own re-
sources system, several shortcomings are criticised, such as the fact that “there is virtually no 
direct link to citizens or tax-payers” (European Commission 2004: 12). The critics argue that 
the increasing complexity has rendered the system intransparent from the citizens’ perspective 
so that they are unable to identify the fiscal costs of EU activities. Moreover, the rebates and 
special provisions are regarded to have undermined the perceived fairness and acceptance of 
the system. It is furthermore argued by the Commission that the lack of an autonomous source 
of finance were the root for the “juste retour” thinking of national governments who are fix-
                                                 
1 For a survey on the EU own resources system see European Commission (2002; 2004). 
2 For details, see European Council (2005). 
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ated on national budgetary “net positions” (i.e. the gap between contributions to the budget 
and backflows, mainly through structural and agricultural spending). This in turn would lead 
to the neglect of European public goods on the EU budget’s expenditure side and a priority 
for transfer policies such as regional policy or agricultural spending.   
In order to overcome these shortcomings, the introduction of a “genuine” own resource has 
been proposed several times, i.e., a tax which would be directly payable to the EU.3 Support-
ers can be found both in the academic literature as well as in the political debate. Examples 
for positions of political actors are the Own Resources Report by the European Commission 
(2004), statements by national representatives such as the former Austrian chancellor Wolf-
gang Schüssel (Schüssel 2006) or the present French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Sarkozy 
2006). In academia pro-EU tax contributions are, for example, Cattoir (2004), Le Cacheux 
(2007) or earlier Biehl (1988). These supporters particularly regard the EU tax as a means to 
increase the system’s transparency. In their view, a tax which is paid to the EU budget would 
create a direct link between citizens and the EU. As a consequence, an EU tax should also 
increase the accountability of the European institutions and contribute to a more efficient 
budgetary policy and foster budgetary discipline. Moreover, the above mentioned supporters 
of an EU tax contend that such a tax would solve or at least alleviate the “juste retour” prob-
lem. Since the dependence of the European budget from national treasuries would decrease, 
national actors should cease to focus on the net position and become more open for shifting 
budgetary shares to the financing of European public goods.  
In contrast to these favourable assessments, other authors are less convinced that an EU tax is 
desirable. Most national politicians refrain from expressing their support for an EU tax. Criti-
cal academic positions can be found in Caesar (2001) or Heinemann et al. (2008). These op-
ponents come to unfavourable conclusions about the impact of a tax resource on financial 
discipline at the EU level. They argue that an EU tax would reduce tax competition and there-
fore de facto lower spending restrictions for the budget. Furthermore, they expect that national 
governments of net payer countries would have fewer incentives to prevent EU budgetary 
authorities from overspending. While in the current contribution system a direct link between 
national budgets and the EU budget is given this would be cut with the introduction of an EU 
tax. From the critics’ perspective this would lower fiscal discipline and increase the fiscal 
burden on tax payers. Neither do these authors expect that an EU tax could overcome the net 
                                                 
3 See Heinemann et al. (2008) for an extensive overview on the debate pro and con EU tax. 
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position thinking. They offer two arguments for this: First, any EU tax would have significant 
inter-country distribution effects so that tensions on net payments could even increase. Sec-
ond, they regard the transfer focus of the expenditure side as the key reason for the net posi-
tion problem so that innovations on the revenue side were unable to solve the problem. 
Notwithstanding this general debate, EU tax supporters have become more specific with re-
spect to the tax base candidates for a possible EU tax (Cattoir 2004; European Commission 
2004). In these contributions, mainly the following tax bases are reflected: Among direct 
taxes: corporate and personal income tax; among indirect taxes: VAT, excise duties (on to-
bacco or alcohol), energy taxation (on kerosene, motor fuel or CO2 emissions) and taxes on 
foreign exchange transactions.  
In the past, Members of the European Parliament have regularly voiced their preference for a 
tax source which should at least partially finance the EU budget (for example in the Haug 
report; see European Parliament 2001). Recently, a joint position of the Parliament was stated 
(European Parliament 2007a): This report took a cautious stance on a possible EU tax. Never-
theless, it stuck to the long-term aim of a genuine own resource. Remarkably, even this cau-
tiously worded report failed to receive unanimous support in the EP: 117 parliamentarians 
opposed it, 458 voted in favour of it and 61 abstained (European Parliament, 2007b). The het-
erogeneity of views can also be illustrated through officially recorded explanations of vote by 
the members of the Parliament which can be found in the minutes of the meeting: The opposi-
tion towards an EU tax was first and foremost stated as reason for “no”-votes by parliamen-
tarians covering the whole political spectrum (left-wing, social democratic, liberal as well as 
EU-sceptic parties).4 This diversity of views makes the European Parliament a promising base 
for studying belief formation in the context of a possible EU tax.  
 
3. Tax policy belief formation 
It would not be surprising if the European Parliament as an institution was rather supportive 
of the idea of financing the budget through a tax. At the national level, tax competencies are a 
key parliamentary competence. Thus, striving for an augmentation of revenue sources is part 
of the European Parliament’s objective of extending its powers towards the usual parliamen-
                                                 
4 In particular, Jim McAllister (NI), Jan Andersson and Anna Hedh (both PES), Liam Aylward, Brian Crowley, 
Seán Ó Neachtain and Eoin Ryan (all UEN), Pedro Guerreiro (GUE/NGL) and Olle Schmidt (ALDE) stated in 
their explanations of vote the aim of an EU tax as reason for their no-vote. 
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tary prerogatives. Even though we thus expect our survey to show a pro-EU tax preference, 
we nevertheless also expect a considerable degree of heterogeneity on this issue across MEPs 
as has become obvious in the debate and vote on the report mentioned above. 
A key question we intend to address is to which respect EU tax preferences of MEPs are 
driven by national interests or by ideological judgements. In their analysis on voting behav-
iour in the US Senate, Poole and Rosenthal (1996) term these two classes of explanations the 
“principal-agent” and the “ideological” approach.5 In the “principal-agent approach” a legisla-
tor is regarded as the agent acting on behalf of the principal who could be modelled, e.g., as 
the median voter of the representative’s constituency or as a particularly well-organised inter-
est group. By contrast, with the “ideological” perspective a politician is described on some 
continuum, e.g., from left to right or from liberal to conservative, and the individual location 
along that dimension should determine political beliefs or voting behaviour.  
In addition to the interests of the constituency and the ideological position, individual charac-
teristics should matter in belief formation. From the above mentioned studies on the formation 
of economic beliefs (e.g., Caplan 2002; Blendon et al. 2004; Heinemann and Janeba 2007) it 
is known that education or socio-economic characteristics of an individual can play a role. 
There is no reason to exclude this possibility a priori for members of a parliament. Moreover, 
a MEP’s field of specialisation should matter: Members of a committee responsible for the 
budget can be expected to have a more informed and clearer view on issues like the EU tax. 
This leaves us with the following conceptual approach to the formation of beliefs on the de-
sirability of an EU tax: 
(1) GTP = GTP (IND, IDE , CC) 
The general preference of a MEP with respect to the EU tax (general tax preference, GTP) 
should depend on: 
− first, a number of individual characteristics (IND) related to the individual MEP’s educa-
tion, his informative situation linked, e.g., to his field of policy specialisation or socio-
economic characteristics such as age or gender, 
− secondly, his ideological position (IDE) according to the “ideological approach” and  
                                                 
5 Precisely, Poole and Rosenthal (1996) make a distinction between the „economic or principal-agent“ and the 
„political or ideological“ approach. 
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− thirdly, country characteristics (CC) which are of relevance for the interests of national 
voters represented by the MEP according to the “principal agent approach”. 
An equivalent conception applies to the preferences with regard to a specific EU tax (specific 
tax preference, STP), e.g., the position towards a European VAT or a European CO2 tax. 
(2) STP = STP (IND, IDE , CC) 
It cannot be expected that the functional dependencies are identical between (1) and (2). 
MEPs who might agree on the general desirability of an EU tax may have very different be-
liefs about the specific choice of a tax base. Only the empirical assessment can decide the 
actual relative weight of the described different dimensions. However, based on existing em-
pirics and theoretical reasoning we can derive expectations about the signs of ideology and 
certain country characteristics. 
For the impact of ideology on the preference for an EU tax two distinct considerations are 
relevant. An EU tax can clearly be regarded as a movement towards a higher state of integra-
tion and towards a more mature European budgetary authority. Preference for integration in 
general, however, has empirically been shown to depend in a non-linear way on a party’s po-
sition on the left-right spectre (Aspinwall 2002): Centrist parties typically are the clearest 
supporters of integration while left and right parties in Europe are more hesitant to give up 
national autonomy. If this single-peakedness of integration support translates to the EU tax 
issue we would also expect centrist parties’ MEPs to be particularly sympathetic towards that 
potential new resource. In addition, however, parliamentarians on the left might view an EU 
tax not primarily as a means of integration but as an instrument to extend the role of the state 
in general, which is a traditional left position. If this government expansion motive outweighs 
the integration motive in the perception of left MEPs they should favour an EU tax equally as 
those from the centre. In summary, we have the clear expectation that liberal or right EU-
sceptics should tend to reject an EU tax and centrist MEPs should favour it. For the left the 
expected sign is ambiguous. 
For the national interests influencing a MEP’s position vis-à-vis an EU tax the following dif-
ferent aspects could play a role: 
− EU tax opponents argue (see above) that the introduction of an EU tax must be seen as a 
preparation for a further expansion of the European budget. If this is the dominating view 
in the EP, representatives from net recipient countries should welcome this while net pay-
ers would rather be opposed. By contrast, EU tax supporters argue that direct tax financ-
 9
ing would increase the transparency with respect to the fiscal burden from EU activities. If 
this is the dominating view, representatives from net recipient countries might be con-
cerned whether the level of transfers can be sustained once the financial burden becomes 
transparent for EU citizens. Thus, the expected sign of a country’s net position is ambigu-
ous if an EU tax is really regarded as a means to increase transparency. If the transparency 
effect is judged to be negligible, net recipients can be expected to favour the tax. 
− Because different tax bases would imply significantly different distributional effects 
among member states (Heinemann et al. 2008), the preference for a specific EU tax 
should not simply depend on the net payer/recipient profile of the current budget but in 
addition also on the distributional effects related to the choice of a specific tax base. This 
implies that equation (2) would require additional variables – proxies for the distributional 
consequences of a specific tax base – compared to equation (1) for a complete specifica-
tion. 
− Besides its revenue consequences for the EU budget, an EU tax can be regarded as a step 
towards European tax harmonisation. In the collusion view on tax harmonisation pio-
neered by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), tax harmonisation is equated with the building 
of a tax cartel motivated by the desire of politicians and bureaucrats to eliminate tedious 
tax competition. In this view, preferences for an EU tax should differ between countries 
according to their tax system’s competitiveness. Representatives from countries with rela-
tively high taxes could regard an EU tax as a means of raising rivals’ costs and to alleviate 
pressure from tax competition. The motivation to neutralise tax competition by harmoni-
sation steps should be most pronounced with respect to highly mobile tax bases such as 
corporate profits. Countries with a high tax burden on mobile factors should then be more 
supportive of an EU tax compared to countries with a low tax burden.  
− Finally, a country’s general integration preferences could also belong to the relevant coun-
try characteristics. MEPs from countries with an EU-sceptical population should be less 
inclined to accept an EU tax compared to their colleagues. Note that integration prefer-
ences thus feed into our conception of belief formation over two distinct channels: via the 
MEP’s own ideology linked to his party affiliation and via his country’s integration pref-
erences.  
 
 
 10
4. Survey and descriptive findings 
The survey among the members of the European Parliament was conducted between March 
and July 2007. The parliamentarians were addressed by written letters and – in case of no re-
action – by subsequent phone calls. Five language versions were sent out: German, French, 
Polish, Spanish and English. Where available, MEPs were addressed by letters and question-
naires in their mother tongue or in English otherwise. 158 members participated by returning 
the filled in questionnaires. The overall response rate of 20.1 per cent differed significantly 
between political groups and countries (see Appendix, Table 6 and 7). Responses could be 
obtained from all but two small member countries (Estonia and Malta). We return to the prob-
lem of selection bias in the econometric section. 
Our survey included the following questions: 
 
Question 1 (Q 1): It has repeatedly been proposed to replace elements of the current system 
of EU own resources by an EU tax which is paid directly to the EU. 
What is your attitude towards such an EU tax? 
Answer scale: From -4 (“very negative”) to +4 (“very positive”) 
 
Question 2 (Q 2): Which type of tax do you think to be particularly suitable as an EU tax? 
Offered options: Value added tax (VAT), Corporate income tax (CIT), Personal income tax 
(PIT), Green taxes (GT), Tax on financial transactions (TFT), Excise tax on alcohol/tobacco 
(TTA) 
Answer scale: From -4 (“not suitable at all”) to +4 (“very suitable”) 
 
Question 3 (Q3): What do you think might be the effect of the introduction of an EU tax on 
the …? 
Offered effects: Financial burden of the citizens, transparency of the EU budget towards the 
citizens, budgetary discipline on the EU level, stability of EU revenues, fair sharing of the 
financial burden between the member states, political struggles between national govern-
ments regarding the budget, support of the EU by its citizens. 
Answer scale: From -4 (“decrease”) to +4 (“increase”) 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics with respect to the general EU tax preference. Interest-
ingly the EP as a whole is only modestly in favour of an EU tax (mean answer +0.83) which 
corresponds to the cautious position on the EU tax taken in the 2007 report described in sec-
tion 2.6 The large standard deviation indicates that the EP is characterised by a substantial 
heterogeneity of views which makes our analysis promising.  
The comparison of means along different indicators referring to our dimensions of belief for-
mation reveals interesting first insights (Table 1): The general EU tax preferences differ with 
high significance across both countries and political groups. Regionally, strong opponents to 
the EU tax come from the UK, Czech Republic and Poland and politically from the EU-
sceptic parties (see appendix for a political characterisation of political groups in the EP). The 
strongest supporters belong to the Greens and Socialists. MEPs from the largest political 
group, the Conservative/Christian-Democrat EPP-ED, and from the liberal ALDE are rather 
split on the issue with means positive but close to zero.  
Analyses of variance do not result in significant findings with respect to the budgetary net 
position no matter whether the overall position or specific policy field related net positions 
(Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Policy) are chosen (for data definitions see next 
section and Table 8 in the appendix).   
By contrast there are significant results if one classifies MEPs according their countries’ tax 
burden or public support for the integration process. Positive positions towards an EU tax are 
strongest in countries which are characterised by a large public revenue-GDP ratio. If one 
restricts the classification to the ratio of direct revenues to GDP the finding about low popu-
larity in low tax countries is robust whereas the strongest support for the EU tax is then ob-
servable in the medium category. Thus, our results at least partially support the link of EU tax 
preferences to tax competition considerations. A finding already obvious from the country 
comparison is made more explicit through the classification by the support for integration 
question from Eurobarometer: The least euphoric position towards an EU tax characterises 
representatives of countries with a rather low support for integration. 
Of course, more definite answers with respect to our model of belief formation must be left to 
the multivariate exercise in the next section. Before that, however, a brief descriptive look at 
                                                 
6 A weighted average where weights correct for the sample selection bias with respect to country and party group 
representation is only slightly higher (+1.082). 
 12
the appeal of different types of EU taxes and the expected consequences of an EU tax is help-
ful. 
Those MEPs who in general support the idea of an EU tax do not agree on the preferred spe-
cific type of tax. Even if one limits the sample to general EU tax supporters, the position vis-
à-vis specific EU taxes ranges from complete rejection to full support for each single type of 
tax (Table 2). Nevertheless a clear ranking appears: Green taxes and VAT rank top on the list 
whereas taxes on financial transactions or alcohol/tobacco come third. Less popular is the idea 
to tax corporate or (least popular) personal income. This is an interesting result insofar a per-
sonal income tax is a highly salient and in this sense a particularly transparent EU tax. Al-
though transparency is a key argument in favour of an EU tax (see section 2), supporters of an 
EU tax in the European Parliament do not opt for this particular transparent type of tax.  
If one compares the expectations on the likely results of an EU tax for supporters and oppo-
nents (Table 3), highly polarised views are the non-surprising outcome. Supporters of a tax 
resource are particularly confident that this reform would make the system more transparent. 
Furthermore, they expect that budgetary discipline, a fair burden sharing and a stabilisation of 
EU revenues could be achieved. Equally, they are optimistic that disputes between member 
countries on the budget would lose explosiveness. Interestingly, supporters of the EU tax do 
not expect a declining financial burden on EU citizens in spite the expected increase in budg-
etary discipline.  
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Table 1: General EU tax preference (Q1) – comparisons of means 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Classified by country 
AT 6 3.00 1.26 1 4 
BE 6 3.17 1.33 1 4 
CZ 5 -1.80 3.49 -4 4 
DE 39 1.03 3.05 -4 4 
FR 16 2.31 2.70 -4 4 
GB 13 -1.77 3.19 -4 3 
HU 5 2.40 1.14 1 4 
IT 7 2.71 1.25 1 4 
PL 9 -0.78 3.23 -4 4 
PT 7 3.57 0.79 2 4 
Other* 39 -0.13 3.30 -4 4 
Total 152 0.83 3.19 -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000 
Classified by political group 
ALDE 18 0.28 3.29 -4 4  
EPP-ED 54 0.28 3.01 -4 4  
GUE/NGL 5 0.40 3.21 -4 4  
ID 7 -4.00 0.00 -4 -4  
ITS 4 1.00 3.83 -4 4  
NI 3 -4.00 0.00 -4 -4  
PES 47 2.81 2.00 -4 4  
The Greens/EFA 5 3.80 0.45 3 4  
UEN 9 -1.22 3.19 -4 4  
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000 
Classified by net position 
Net contributor 95 0.76   3.24 -4 4 
Net recipient 57 0.95   3.13 -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.7241 
Classified by net  position in Common Agricultural Policy 
Net contributor 84 0.92   3.19  -4 4 
Net recipient 68 0.72   3.21 -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.7076 
Classified by net position in Structural Policy 
Net contributor 106 0.86 3.23 -4 4 
Net recipient 46 0.76 3.13 -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.8630 
* Only countries with number of observations > 5 are listed individually 
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Cont. Table 1: General EU tax preference (Q1) – comparisons of means 
Classified by 2006 total revenue from taxes and social security/GDP  
High (> 45% GDP) 49 1.51   3.03 -4 4 
Medium 73 1.12  3.10 -4 4 
Low (< 40% GDP) 30   -1.00  3.07  -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0014 
Classified by 2006 direct tax revenue/GDP 
High (> 13% GDP) 49 0.20   3.45 -4 4 
Medium 70   1.60  2.82  -4 4 
Low (< 9% GDP) 33 0.12   3.26  -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0213 
Classified by national support of the EU* 
High (>60%) 79 0.66   3.15 -4 4 
Medium 37 1.97   2.82 -4 4 
Low (<50%) 36 0.03   3.38  -4 4 
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0254 
 
* Eurobarometer Spring 2007, EU27 averaged 57% 
 
 
 
Table 2: Type of EU tax preferred by general EU tax supporters (Q2) 
 Observations* Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Green taxes 86  2.24 2.29 -4 4 
Value added tax 85  2.06 2.20 -4 4 
Tax on financial transac-
tions 
82  1.43 2.88 -4 4 
Excise tax on alco-
hol/cigarettes 
83  1.18 2.66 -4 4 
Corporate income tax 82  0.79 2.65 -4 4 
Personal income tax 78 -0.79 2.43 -4 4 
Total   1.18 2.70   
* Only MEPs included with answer for Q1 > 0. 
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Table 3: Effects of an EU tax – expectations of EU tax supporters and opponents 
(Q3) 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expectations  of EU tax supporters* 
Financial burden on the citizens 92  0.36 1.46 -4 4 
Transparency of the EU budget towards 
the citizens 
95  2.83 1.35 -2 4 
Budgetary Discipline on the EU level 93  1.97 1.74 -4 4 
Stability of EU revenues 95  2.11 1.69 -3 4 
Fair sharing of the financial burden be-
tween the member states 
95  1.99 1.67 -2 4 
Political struggles between national 
governments regarding the budget 
96 -1.51 2.37 -4 4 
National support of the EU 95  1.31 2.05 -4 4 
Total   1.29 2.24 -4 4 
Expectations  of EU tax opponents** 
Financial burden on the citizens 46  1.89 2.37 -4 4 
Transparency of the EU budget towards 
the citizens 
46  0.87 2.51 -4 4 
Budgetary discipline on the EU level 46 -0.78 2.37 -4 4 
Stability of EU revenues 45  0.31 2.22 -4 4 
Fair sharing of the financial burden be-
tween the member states 
46 -0.41 2.31 -4 4 
Political struggles between national 
governments regarding the budget 
46  0.43 2.45 -4 4 
National support of the EU 46 -1.72 2.78 -4 4 
Total   0.08 2.65 -4 4 
* MEPs included with answer for Q1 > 0, **MEPs included with answer for Q1< 0. 
 
Compared to the supporters, opponents of an EU tax in the European Parliament have re-
versed expectations. Their largest concern is that the financial burden will increase as a result 
of weakening budgetary discipline under an EU tax. As a consequence, they expect the sup-
port of the EU by its citizens to be undermined. Opponents do not negate the expectation of 
larger transparency. Obviously, however, they do not expect the transparency effect to signifi-
cantly boost discipline. In difference to the supporters, the opponents rather expect even an 
intensification of national struggles over the budget and a less fair burden sharing once a tax 
is introduced. These controversies bear clear similarities to the split normative assessment in 
the academic literature surveyed above. 
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5. Econometric testing 
The multivariate testing now aims at identifying the relevant drivers of EU tax policy prefer-
ences in the context of the two step model developed in section 3. This means that first gen-
eral tax preferences are analysed according to the framework of equation (1) before in a sec-
ond step the specific position towards the different possible types of tax bases is inspected 
according to equation (2). 
 
5.1 Method 
Since for all questions answers are available on a scale from -4 to +4 (“very negative” to 
“very positive”) which allows a clear ordering of answers, an ordered probit approach is ap-
propriate. As it is a problem for many other micro- and macroeconomic datasets, our survey 
data may suffer from the problem of selection bias and not be fully representative for the un-
derlying population. Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix document that there are differing response 
rates across countries and party formations. However, this problem’s impact should not be 
exaggerated. If any of the included explanatory variables drive response rates, this does not 
distort estimation coefficients: Differing response rates, e.g. for parties, have their impact on 
the number of available observations, the standard errors and, hence, the reported significance 
of the respective coefficients (i.e. party dummies). In this sense, regression techniques cope 
with an uneven availability of observations. Differing response rates only distort results from 
a conditional model like ours under subtle assumptions: If (a) an unobservable variable drives 
the response rate and (b) this latent variable is correlated with an included explanatory vari-
able, then this included variable’s estimation coefficient is misleading. Like in most other 
empirical research designs, we are not able to exclude this problem in principle. But, given 
that our set of explanatory variables covers a wide spectre of aspects, this risk is limited and 
not more substantial than in many other econometric applications. Nevertheless, as a precau-
tion we apply a weighted estimator where weights correct for the sample’s selection bias with 
respect to both country and political group representation. This means that underrepresented 
observations get a larger weight than overrepresented cases. Furthermore we allow for cluster-
ing of error terms among MEPs from one political group to cope with problems from the pos-
sible omission of non-observable determinants. 
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5.2 Variable definitions  
According to our model of belief formation, we make use of variables along three dimensions: 
First, political group membership since according to the “ideological approach” this should be 
a decisive driver of tax preferences; second, individual characteristics of a MEP quantifying, 
e.g., her experience or her political specialization; and, third, country characteristics which 
depict specific national interests and should, according to the “principal agent approach”, also 
have an impact on a MEP’s position. 
In our testing, we make use of the following variables which partially have already been used 
in the descriptive section before: 
Ideology: 
Political group: Ideology is measured by political group dummies.7 The Socialist dummy is 
dropped so that the dummies measure the ideological effect relative to the average position of 
the members of the Socialist group. For the political orientation of political groups see the 
appendix.  
As argued in section 3 we expect parties on the right to be contra an EU tax, parties in the 
centre to be pro whereas our sign expectation for the left is ambiguous. 
Individual characteristics, education and information: 
Age: Age is an easily available personal characteristic which represents experience. We also 
experimented with gender which, however, did not have significant results and therefore was 
dropped. 
Business/Economic studies: The dummy for MEPs who state in their publicly available CVs 
to have studied business administration or economics can clearly be seen as an informative 
proxy. These MEPs should have informative advantages with respect to tax systems, tax com-
petition but also with respect to economics in general. 
Member of budget committee: This dummy points at the specialisation of MEPs and can also 
be seen as an information proxy. Typically, members of the specialised committees have also 
the role as opinion leaders and opinion formers for their political groups. 
                                                 
7 Ideology and party affiliation are two rather distinct concepts. Although ideology – however it may be concep-
tualized – should drive party affiliation there may nevertheless a considerable ideological heterogeneity within 
one party. We abstract from this subtleties and equate party affiliation with ideology but do not exclude that 
future refinements may be worthwhile. 
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Years in Parliament: The length of membership in Parliament is relevant for the familiarity 
with EU institutions including the budgetary system. It may also stand for the closeness of 
participation in Parliament networks and the assimilation of views to the Parliament’s and 
political group’s dominating views.  
With respect to these personal characteristics we do not have particular expectations about the 
sign of the effects. 
Country characteristics: 
Dummy for new member states: The new member states from Central and Eastern Europe 
have common properties related to both their status as transition countries and their relative 
short historical experience of political autonomy. It is not unlikely that these common features 
have relevance for the attraction of an EU tax. We expect that due to these common factors 
the new members are particularly keen to keep their tax autonomy so that the expected sign is 
negative. 
National support of the EU: This variable is quantified on the basis of the Eurobarometer’s 
question on the general affirmation of the country’s EU membership. The expected sign is 
positive. 
Net payment position: For the quantification of this variable we do not rely on historical data 
but on forward looking simulation results for the current financial framework from Heine-
mann et al. (2008). The forward looking specification of the variable indicates how in future a 
country would benefit from a budgetary expansion and, hence, is a better proxy for the MEPs’ 
incentives. Precisely, the variable measures the yearly average of the net balance to GDP in 
per cent for the years 2007-2013 where the net balance includes administrative spending.  
Net payment position on CAP/structural spending: Besides the overall net position we have 
also experimented with net positions on the quantitatively most important policy fields which 
are agricultural and structural spending. Both policies have very different distributive profiles: 
While for structural spending there is a clear link with a country’s relative wealth this is not 
the case for agriculture where also relatively wealthy countries are among the net recipients. 
Again, data are calculated on the basis of a forward looking approach and taken from Heine-
mann et al. (2008).  
Tax burden: For the general EU tax preference we use the ratio of overall revenues from taxes 
and social security contributions to GDP as a proxy for a country’s tax burden. Alternatively, 
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we also work with the ratio of direct taxes to GDP. If the motive of alleviating tax competi-
tion pressure is relevant, the sign should be positive. 
 
Additional country characteristics with respect to particular tax base preference 
Additional burden: Depending on the choice of the tax base distributional effects for member 
countries will be different. We would expect that MEPs tend to reject those tax bases which 
put a relative large burden on their own countries. Heinemann et al. (2008) offer data on the 
distributional consequences for different EU tax bases which are used here. Precisely, the 
variable “additional burden” measures how for a certain tax base a country’s contribution to 
the EU budget would change compared to a contribution key based on GNI shares. We expect 
a negative sign for this control variable. 
Competitiveness of national tax system: While our indicator for the international competitive-
ness of a tax system is of an aggregate character for the general EU tax preference we can 
make use of more focussed indicators for the specific EU tax preferences for the following 
three tax bases:  
− VAT: The standard VAT rate is easily available. 
− Personal income tax: The top income tax rate is the relevant tax rate for high income indi-
viduals who also are particularly mobile.   
− Corporate tax: Here we employ effective average tax rates (EATR) calculated by the ZEW 
Mannheim for a profitable investment project and taking account both of statutory tax 
rates and the detailed provisions of the tax law such as depreciation provisions according 
to the model of Devereux and Griffith (1999); for the conceptual approach see Overesch 
(2005). 
For the other tax bases included in our study (green taxes, excise taxes, transaction taxes) no 
sensible indicators of national tax competitiveness are available. For the included tax level 
indicators we expect a positive sign at least for the corporate tax indicator where international 
competition is clearly an issue.  
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5.3 Results 
Table 4 presents our results for the first step estimations with the answers to the general EU 
tax preference question as the dependent variable. The rationale of an ordered multinomial 
model is the identification of a latent variable which drives the probability that an observation 
(i.e. a survey participant in our context) will be assigned to a certain outcome (i.e. answer 
class). The sign but not the size of the coefficients can be interpreted where a posi-
tive/negative sign indicates that a higher/lower answer category (i.e. a more affirma-
tive/negative answer) becomes more likely. Marginal effects give an indication for the size of 
this effect and can be calculated for each different outcome where the sum of marginal effects 
for all outcomes add up to one for each explanatory variable. In the tables we report the mar-
ginal effect for the most affirmative answer category +4. Thus the reported marginal effects 
show the change in the probability that an answer +4 will occur if the explanatory variable 
increases by one unit.8  
Specifications (1) to (4) differ only with respect to the included country variables: In the re-
gressions (2) and (3) the overall net payment position of regression (1) is replaced by the net 
position in structural policy and agricultural policy, respectively. In specification (4) the reve-
nue-GDP ratio of (1) is replaced by the ratio of direct tax revenues to GDP. 
A first robust result of all specifications is the highly significant impact of ideology on EU tax 
preferences. Compared to the Socialists (the dummy which was dropped) all other political 
groups show a lower support for an EU tax with the exception of the Greens who are even 
more in favour. The result thus has some resemblance to the U-shape functional link between 
ideology and support for European integration: Both parties on the right (UEN, ITS) and the 
very left (GUE/NGL) reject the tax harmonisation step necessarily involved with an EU tax. 
In contrast to the usual findings concerning integration preferences in general, however, the 
two largest parties situated in the political centre of the ideological spectre, the Socialists and 
the Conservatives/Christian Democrats, disagree strongly on the EU tax. The marginal effects 
show that the probability of a parliamentarian from the EPP-ED to support an EU tax (answer 
category +4) is 23 per cent lower compared to that of a Socialist MEP. 
A second robust finding is that individual characteristics are of equal importance. Older MEPs 
and MEPs with a relatively long EP membership are more in favour of an EU tax and MEPs 
                                                 
8 The marginal effects are calculated for the mean value of the explanatory variable unless this variable is a 
dummy. In this case the marginal effect refers to a switch from 0 to 1. 
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with an academic background in economics/business administration or members of the budget 
committee are more opposed to an EU tax. Hence, a relatively high economic competence and 
expertise is linked to a less favourable view of an EU tax whereas a longer individual history 
of political socialisation and assimilation in the Parliament favours a supportive position. This 
is no implausible finding if one assumes that the length of membership in the Parliament in-
fluences individual views towards the Parliament’s institutional self-interest. 
Turning now to the country characteristics, which are to shed light on the principal-agent view 
of preference formation, we detect a robustly significant impact of the new member country 
dummy. The marginal effects are of a substantial magnitude and comparable in size to the 
ideological dummies. As expected, representatives of the new member countries are rather 
critical of any measures limiting their countries’ tax autonomy. National support of the EU is 
only weakly significant in specification (2). The overall net payment position enters specifica-
tion (1) with a positive sign and high significance, but turns insignificant in variant (4). The 
alternative net position measures related to the particular distributive profiles of structural and 
agricultural spending do not show up significantly. The revenue-GDP ratios are largely insig-
nificant. Only the direct tax revenue ratio (specification (4)) has an unexpected negative sign. 
Obviously, representatives of countries who already today are confronted with a high direct 
tax burden on their citizens fear resistance against increasing this tax burden further. 
Table 5 summarises the estimation results with now the specific EU tax preference question 
being the dependent variable. Again, ideology is robustly significant. Also in regard to the 
specific tax bases the Socialists tend to be the most EU tax friendly political group, again with 
the exception of the Greens. The latter party’s ideological focus markedly shows up with a 
large marginal effect in the case of green taxes. The individual characteristics have a differen-
tiated impact. Members of the budget committee are rather opposed to a European VAT, a 
corporate income tax or an excise tax whereas they do not show different positions to non-
members for the other tax bases. MEPs with academic economic expertise tend to reject cor-
porate income tax and excise taxes. Years in parliament cease to be significant when it comes 
to the opinions on these particular taxes whereas the positive impact of age on the EU tax 
support only survives for VAT and corporate taxation. The weaker link between the length of 
EP membership and particular tax preference is no contradiction to the view that membership 
leads to an assimilation of views: While the EP has a traditional positive position on an EU 
tax in general, there is no traditional EP position on any particular type of EU tax. 
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Among country variables the new member dummy is again important: MEPs from new EU 
countries are critical of all specific taxes with the exception of excise taxes where answers do 
not differ significantly between new and old members. A high national support for the EU is 
associated with a larger support for VAT, green taxes and excise taxes, whereas the impact on 
personal income tax preferences is rather negative. Perhaps representatives of particularly EU 
friendly countries might fear that an EU income tax could be to the detriment of the integra-
tion process. The net position is significantly positive with the exception of the VAT regres-
sion. For all other five tax bases in the debate representatives from net recipient countries tend 
to be more supportive compared to representatives from net payer countries.  
Interesting insight emerges with respect to the variables related to the distributional conse-
quences and tax competition aspects: In the case of taxes on financial transactions those 
MEPs tend to reject the specific tax who come from countries which would have distribu-
tional disadvantages from such a tax. This finding for the financial transaction tax is very 
plausible since its distributional consequences can be assumed to be general knowledge given 
the well known leading position of London and Luxembourg as financial centres. As expected 
the indicator of a country’s tax competitiveness is highly significant in the case of a corporate 
income tax where mobility of the tax base and, hence, competition is largest. The strongest 
supporters of an EU corporate tax come from the least competitive tax locations. This finding 
supports the view that EU tax preferences are also influenced by the motive of alleviating tax 
competition pressures and raising rivals’ costs. 
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Table 4: Ordered probit results for Q1 – support for an EU tax in general 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
 
Political group* 
ALDE -0.461*** -0.084   -0.462*** -0.085 -0.455*** -0.083 -0.246*** -0.047 
 (0.039)   (0.045)   (0.041)   (0.043)   
EPP-ED -1.149*** -0.232   -1.172*** -0.240 -1.163*** -0.235 -1.178*** -0.230 
 (0.053)   (0.053)   (0.056)   (0.051)   
GUE/NGL -0.824*** -0.114   -0.943*** -0.124 -0.868*** -0.117 -0.847*** -0.110 
 (0.138)   (0.186)   (0.138)   (0.093)   
ID -10.321 *** -0.203   -9.928*** -0.204     -10.342*** -0.203 -9.577*** -0.189 
 (0.373)   (0.355)   (0.513)   (0.164)   
ITS -1.083*** -0.128   -1.021*** -0.128 -1.095*** -0.129 -1.347*** -0.131 
 (0.138)   (0.107)   (0.176)   (0.175)   
The Greens/EFA 0.626***  0.181   0.528***  0.149  0.579***  0.165 0.437***  0.115 
 (0.065)   (0.066)   (0.079)   (0.074)   
NI -10.279 *** -0.154  -9.846*** -0.157     -10.045*** -0.154 -9.560*** -0.146 
 (0.295)   (0.294)   (0.300)   (0.233)   
UEN -1.578*** -0.155  -1.596*** -0.159 -1.605*** -0.156 -1.452*** -0.144 
 (0.136)   (0.169)   (0.159)   (0.117)   
 
Education/ information 
Age  0.026***  0.006   0.028***  0.006  0.027***  0.006   0.0295***  0.006 
 (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)   
-0.755*** -0.141  -0.750*** -0.143 -0.769*** -0.144 -0.759*** -0.137 Business/Economic 
studies (0.235)   (0.258)   (0.258)   (0.153)   
-0.513 ** -0.113  -0.500 ** -0.112 -0.500  ** -0.110 -0.572  ** -0.122 Member of budget 
Committee (0.219)   (0.222)   (0.210)   (0.239)   
Years in EP  0.028 **  0.006  0.023   *  0.005 0.026 **  0.006   0.0374***  0.008 
 (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.010)   
 
Country characteristics 
  -1.159*** -0.178 -0.617   * -0.114      -0.693  ** -0.123 -1.617*** -0.212 New member state 
  (0.390)  (0.348)        (0.297)   (0.349)   
   0.010  0.002 0.012 *  0.003       0.011  0.002      -0.001    0.0003 National support of 
the EU   (0.007)  (0.007)        (0.007)   (0.003)   
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   0.232***  0.051 - -         0.174  0.037 Net payment position 
(0.082)       (0.154)   
       0.485  0.108 Net payment position 
on CAP - - - -  (0.501)   - - 
       0.021   0.005 Net payment position 
on structural policy - -       (0.215)   - - - - 
     -0.019 -0.004       -0.030 -0.007       -0.027 -0.006 Total revenues/GDP 
(0.038)         (0.040)    (0.040)   - - 
-0.145*** -0.031 Direct tax reve-
nues/GDP - - - - - - (0.040)   
 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint signifi-
cance of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 152 152 152 152 
Pseudo R² 0.159 0.155 0.157 0.185 
Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for an EU tax); *PES set as reference category. 
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Table 5: Ordered probit results for Q2 – support for specific EU taxes 
 Value added tax Corporate income tax Personal income tax 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Political group* 
-0.154   * -0.036 -0.477***  -0.035 -0.363*** -0.007 ALDE 
(0.079)  (0.133)  (0.116)  
-0.729*** -0.171 -1.440*** -0.135 -0.670*** -0.016 EPP-ED 
(0.122)  (0.054)  (0.066)  
-2.428*** -0.174 0.021  0.002 -1.170*** -0.010 GUE/NGL 
(0.427)  (0.026)  (0.227)  
-1.786*** -0.174 -2.385*** -0.053 -1.762*** -0.011 ID 
(0.099)  (0.146)  (0.288)  
-1.805*** -0.168 -1.496*** -0.048 -1.431*** -0.010 ITS 
(0.529)  (0.099)  (0.210)  
-9.287*** -0.185 -9.364*** -0.055 -9.165*** -0.012 NI 
(0.207)  (0.272)  (0.417)  
-0.930*** -0.145 1.011***  0.199 -0.369  ** -0.006 The Greens/EFA 
(0.066)  (0.062)  (0.173)  
-0.587*** -0.112 -0.628*** -0.040 -0.735  ** -0.010 UEN 
(0.074)  (0.224)  (0.320)  
Education/ information 
 0.038*** 0.009  0.020**  0.002 0.024  0.001 Age 
(0.009)  (0.100)  (0.019)  
 0.034 0.009 -0.275* -0.024 0.196  0.006 Business/Economic 
studies (0.221)  (0.158)  (0.216)  
-0.716  ** -0.179 -0.443** -0.044  -0.197 -0.005 Member budget 
Committee (0.304)  (0.206)  (0.255)  
-0.018 -0.004 -0.005  -0.0005 0.004   0.0001 Years in EP 
(0.014)  (0.016)  (0.020)  
Country characteristics 
-0.509*** -0.107 -1.585*** -0.074 -3.180*** -0.032 New member state 
(0.103)  (0.552)  (0.806)  
 0.024   *  0.006 -0.018 -0.002 -0.040*** -0.001 National support of the 
EU (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.008)  
-0.064 -0.016  0.633***  0.062  0.699***   0.017 Net payment position 
(0.204)  (0.156)  (0.151)  
 0.0003       0.0006 0.002   0.0002 -0.101*** -0.003 Additional burden 
(0.009)  (0.021)  (0.025)  
-0.138 -0.034 Standard VAT 
(0.087)  - - - - 
0.098***  0.010 EATR - - (0.029)  - - 
-0.001      -0.00003Top PIT - - - - (0.019)  
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint signifi-
cance of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 133 127 123 
Pseudo R² 0.130 0.178 0.108 
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Cont. Table 5: Ordered probit results for Q2 – support for specific EU taxes 
 
 Green tax Transaction tax Excise tax 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Political group 
-0.378 *** -0.079 -1.506*** -0.096 -0.153*** -0.035 ALDE 
(0.054)  (0.196)  (0.045)  
-1.080*** -0.240 -1.955*** -0.241 -0.554*** -0.128 EPP-ED 
(0.061)  (0.152)  (0.093)  
-0.142 -0.032  0.751***  0.164  0.527  0.158 GUE/NGL 
(0.139)  (0.099)  (0.326)  
-1.609*** -0.163 -1.783*** -0.077 -0.873*** -0.131 ID 
(0.234)  (0.354)  (0.219)  
-0.265* -0.056  0.518***  0.100  0.025  0.006 ITS 
(0.161)  (0.030)  (0.178)  
-9.048*** -0.176 -9.820*** -0.083 -8.375*** -0.174 NI 
(0.281)  (0.293)  (0.230)  
 1.109*** 0.378  0.782***  0.171  0.333 **  0.093 The Greens/EFA 
(0.054)  (0.068)  (0.090)  
-0.779*** -0.129 -1.794*** -0.089 -0.433*** -0.085 UEN 
(0.225)  (0.162)  (0.163)  
Education/ information 
 0.010 0.003  0.014  0.002  0.100  0.002 Age 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  
-0.137 -0.032 -0.392 -0.046 -0.552*** -0.116 Business/Economic 
studies (0.254)  (0.277)  (0.181)  
-0.510** -0.124 -0.226 -0.031 -0.575*** -0.139 Member budget 
Committee (0.258)  (0.304)  (0.185)  
 0.005 0.001  0.017  0.002 -0.019        -0.005 Years in EP 
(0.025)  (0.042)  (0.026)  
Country characteristics 
-0.891*** -0.161 -1.588** -0.108 -0.371 -0.080 New member state 
(0.168)  (0.754)  (0.666)  
 0.026*** 0.006 -0.007 -0.001  0.019**  0.004 National support of the  
EU (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008)  
 0.314** 0.077  0.320*  0.044  0.217*  0.053 Net payment position 
(0.135)  (0.170)  (0.118)  
-0.001 -0.0002 -0.005*** - 0.001 -0.0002    -0.00004Additional burden 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint signifi-
cance of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 139 130 137 
Pseudo R² 0.117 0.233 0.068 
 
Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for an EU tax); *PES set as reference cate-
gory. 
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6. Conclusions 
Our results indicate which factors drive the support of MEPs for a fundamental reform of the 
EU's revenue system towards an establishment of a true own resource. Although the findings 
confirm an important role for ideology they also demonstrate that both individual and country 
characteristics are of similar importance in shaping the support for the introduction of an EU 
tax. The importance of national interests in this reform debate also partially corrects the view 
that national cohesion of views in the EP has become negligible compared to party cohesion. 
In contrast to the roll-call vote literature which favours the latter view, our study is not based 
on votes but on individual opinions of MEPs which is a more appropriate way to measure 
diversity of preferences in the Parliament.  
Among the national dimensions which matter significantly, the new versus old member coun-
try dimension, the net payer position, a country’s tax competitiveness (for corporate taxation) 
and the distributional consequences (for a financial transaction tax) stand out. These insights 
allow us to answer the question posed in our paper’s title in the following way: Those parlia-
mentarians are most afraid of an EU tax who represent a country which is a new EU member, 
characterised by a highly competitive corporate tax system or a well known distributive loser 
of the specific EU tax in question. Apart from that, net payer countries’ MEPs are particularly 
critical on most of the specific types of EU taxes. 
The fact that the net recipients tend to favour an EU tax allows us drawing cautious conclu-
sions on the consequences of an EU tax as they are perceived within the EP: Obviously MEPs 
do not expect that the transparency effect of an EU tax will be so effective that it could limit 
the inter-country redistribution being achieved through the budget. On the contrary, since net 
recipients are particularly enthusiastic about an EU tax they obviously hope that an EU tax 
would stabilize or even increase redistributive flows. This perception is insofar plausible as 
even the supporters of an EU tax in general tend to reject a highly visible EU tax like the per-
sonal income tax.  
A country’s tax competitiveness plays a highly significant role where the tax base is most 
mobile, which is the case for corporate taxation. At least with regard to this particularly EU 
tax, preferences clearly mirror the disagreement on corporate tax harmonisation in general, 
where low (high) tax countries are opposed (favour) harmonisation steps. This polarisation 
supports the view that high tax countries’ representatives in the EP regard an EU corporate tax 
as an instrument to raise their rivals’ costs. 
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At least where the distributive consequences of a particular EU tax base are common knowl-
edge they have an impact on MEPs’ preferences. This can be demonstrated by the significant 
results for a tax on financial transactions. The concentration of financial transactions on few 
financial centres within the EU is well-known. This knowledge leads to a particular attraction 
of that tax in countries without significant financial centres.  
We would like to stress that our test for the relevance of national interests among political 
decision makers in the EU tax debate is of a conservative nature since MEPs think more 
European than representatives from national governments and parliaments. 
The starting point of our study has been the observation that there is a contrast between the 
advanced legislative and political role of the European Union on the one side and its financing 
system on the other. While the former qualifies the Union as a central level of government 
within a European federal system, the latter is rather typical for an international organisation 
based on international cooperation. Our positive approach offers an explanation why: Na-
tional interests with respect to both the revenue system and the European tax system are still 
too powerful and heterogeneous for a unanimous agreement on far reaching reforms. Hence, 
regarding its revenue system the European Union is likely to remain an international organisa-
tion rather than a fully developed upper government level of a European fiscal federation.   
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Appendix 
 
Political groups within the European Parliament 
The 6th European Parliament (EP) consists of 785 members. The MEPs are elected for a legislative 
period of five years by the citizens of the European Union or more precisely the citizens of the Euro-
pean Union’s member states. 
At the time our survey was conducted, eight political groups existed:: EPP-ED, PES, ALDE, UEN, 
GUE/NGL, The Greens/EFA, ID and ITS. Further 13 non-attached parliamentarians formed the group 
of the so called NI (Non-Inscrits). 20 MEP are necessarily to form a political group and a minimum of 
1/5 of the member states need to be represented.  
With 277 members EPP-ED (Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and Euro-
pean Democrats) was the biggest group in the Parliament. It was the sole group to contain MEPs from 
all 27 Member States of the Union. The EPP-ED consists of Christian Democrats, Conservatives, cen-
tre and centre-right parties. Its policies are integration-friendly and the group was a strong supporter of 
the European Constitution.  
PES (Socialist Group in the European Parliament) was the second largest group and contained social 
democratic, socialist and labour parties. Its general ideology is characterised by a mixed approach 
between accepting competition and offering protection for the working people. Like the EPP-ED the 
PES was strongly in favour of a European Constitution. 
The third largest group in the European Parliament were the Liberals, the ALDE (Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe). In full light of liberal tradition they emphasise decentralisation, pro-
corporate standpoints including rejection of overregulation and the decrease of bureaucracy and sub-
ventions as well as an enhanced transparency inside EU institutions. The ALDE group is in favour of 
further European integration in general. 
The UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations Group) represented the fourth largest group in the parlia-
ment and is located clearly on the right scale of political ideology. It is composed of national conserva-
tive and generally EU-sceptic members. However the group is not against the EU in principle, but 
rather insists on a sovereign nation state. 
GUE/NGL (Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left): This group includes 
socialist and communist political groups. In its own statement it is in favour of a European integration, 
but wants to see it moving in a different direction of welfare, solidarity and a stronger role of protec-
tion and redistribution. 
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The Greens/EFA (Group of the Greens / European Free Alliance) is composed of two independent 
groups with common goals for Europe. Ideologically their main concern is to shift the Union’s empha-
sis on cultural, ecological and social values and away from economy dominated policies. 
The members of the ID Group (Independence/Democracy Group) are united by their common goal of 
opposing the EU and further European integration. Most members satisfy with the idea of remaining 
national sovereignty and opposing any kind of EU Constitution. However, some MEPs, in particular 
the English representatives from the UK Independence Party, campaign for a complete withdrawal of 
their country from the EU. 
The former ITS (Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group) was located on the furthest right scale of 
the European Parliament. It was founded only in 2007, since before the accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria the attempts to form a far right group failed on the required threshold of minimum 20 mem-
bers. The cohesion of the heterogeneously composed group was primarily guaranteed through com-
mon goals concerning broadly speaking “anti” issues, such as anti-immigration, anti-Turkish EU 
membership and anti-EU constitution. The group ceased to exist in November of the same year due to 
internal disputes. 
For further information see e.g. Corbett et al. (2005) and the political groups’ websites. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Response rate by political group 
Group Number of seats Responses Response rate 
ALDE 104 18 17.31% 
EPP-ED 278 55 19.78% 
GUE/NGL 41 5 12.20% 
ID 24 7 29.17% 
ITS 23 4 17.39% 
NI 13 3 23.08% 
PES 216 50 23.15% 
The Greens/EFA 42 6 14.29% 
UEN 44 10 22.73% 
Total 785 158 20.13% 
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Table 7: Response rate by country 
Country Number of seats Responses Response rate 
AT 18 7 38.89% 
BE 24 6 25.00% 
BG 18 1 5.56% 
CY 6 1 16.67% 
CZ 24 5 20.83% 
DE 99 40 40.40% 
DK 14 4 28.57% 
EE 6 0 0.00% 
ES 54 4 7.41% 
FI 14 4 28.57% 
FR 78 16 20.51% 
GB 78 13 16.67% 
GR 24 1 4.17% 
HU 24 5 20.83% 
IE 13 3 23.08% 
IT 78 8 10.26% 
LT 13 3 23.08% 
LU 6 2 33.33% 
LV 9 2 22.22% 
MT 5 0 0.00% 
NL 27 3 11.11% 
PL 54 10 18.52% 
PT 24 7 29.17% 
RO 35 4 11.43% 
SE 19 4 21.05% 
SI 7 1 14.29% 
SK 14 4 28.57% 
Total 785 158   20.13% 
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Table 8: Variable definitions 
Variable Unit Explanations 
Political Groups 
Political group dummies 
Personal information 
Age Discrete vari-
able 
Calculated as 2007 minus year of birth 
Education variables 
Business/Economic 
studies 
Dummy Tertiary education in business administration or economics 
Proxies for degree of information and experience 
Years in EP Discrete 
variable 
Calculated as 2007 minus year of first EP entry 
Member budget control 
committee 
Dummy Deals with control of the implementation of the budget  
Member budget commit-
tee 
Dummy Deals with EU budget, in particular expenditure side 
Country characteristics 
Total revenue (taxes and 
social security contribu-
tions) 
Continuous 
variable 
In % of GDP at market prices for 2006, Source: European Com-
mission (2007c) 
Direct tax Continuous 
variable 
In % of GDP for 2006, Source: European Commission (2007b) 
Net payment position Continuous 
variable 
Difference between received payments and contributions, in % of 
GNI, receipts incl. administration expenses, Source: Heinemann et 
al. (2008) 
Net payment position 
CAP 
Continuous 
variable 
Difference between received agricultural payments and contribu-
tions caused by agricultural spending, in % of GNI, Source: 
Heinemann et al. (2008) 
Net payment position 
structural policy 
Continuous 
variable 
Difference between received structural spending and contributions 
caused by structural spending, in % of GNI, Source: Heinemann et 
al. (2008) 
New member state Dummy Old members of EU (EU15) set at 0, others at 1 
National support of the 
EU 
Continuous 
variable 
In %, general affirmation of country’s membership in the EU, 
Source: European Commission (2007a) 
Standard VAT Continuous 
variable 
Standard rate of VAT, in %, Source: German Federal Ministry of 
Finance (2006) 
Top PIT Continuous 
variable 
Top rate of PIT, in %, Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance 
(2006) 
EATR Continuous 
variable 
2006 Effective average tax rate, in %, Source: ZEW 
Additional burden VAT, 
CIT, green tax, PIT, 
excise tax, transaction 
tax 
Continuous 
variable 
In %, Source: Heinemann et al. (2008) 
Source: European Parliament if no other source is named. 
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